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Abstract: Metaphysicians often distinguish between joints and basic ways. Joints 
are the unified and joint-carving properties that trace the structure of the world. They 
are theorized under the ideology of structural, perfectly natural, or sparse properties. 
Basic ways are the ultimate and independent properties that give rise to all others. 
They are theorized under the ideology of grounding, where the ungrounded properties 
are the basic ways. While these notions are often seen as rivals, I argue that we need 
both, because the joints and the basic ways crosscut. For the sake being exhaustive 
and ecumenical, I distinguish between natural and normative sorts of joints and basic 
ways. I argue that, for either sort, if there is such a sort of joint and basic way, then 
there are joints that are not basic ways and there are basic ways that are not joints.  
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Metaphysicians often distinguish between joints and basic ways. Joints are 
the unified and joint-carving properties that trace the structure of the world. They 
are opposed to the gerrymandered and the gruesome. The property of being an 
electron is a joint while being an electron or a cow is not, because, among other 
things, appealing to electrons is explanatory in a way that appealing to electrons-or-
cows is not. Philosophers such as David Armstrong (1978), David Lewis (1983), and 
Ted Sider (2011) have revived the Platonic image of “joints of reality” by positing 
 
1 I would like to thank the members of the Rutgers Metaphysics Reading Group for comments. I would also like to 
thank Ted Sider and Karen Bennett for several rounds of incredibly helpful feedback. Finally, I would like to 
express my deepest gratitude to Jonathan Schaffer – who spent an inordinate amount of time helping me with this 
project.   
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jointiness, respectively, in the form of sparseness, naturalness properties, and 
structure. Let us say, then, that some properties are jointy. 
Basic ways are the ultimate and independent properties that give rise to all 
others. They are opposed to the derivative and the dependent. The property being 
an electron is a basic way while being a table is not, because, in part, electrons help 
generate tables. Philosophers such as Kit Fine (2012), Gideon Rosen (2010), and 
Jonathan Schaffer (2009) have revived the Aristotelian conception of “priority in 
nature” by positing the relation or operation of grounding. Let us hold, then, that 
some properties are grounded in others, while yet other properties are ungrounded 
and so are basic ways of being. 
These different appeals to joints and basic ways are usually viewed as ‘rival 
approaches’ (Sider 2011: 142) to a metaphysics of fundamentality. Both approaches, 
for instance, consider being an electron to be “fundamental” in that one treats it as a 
joint and the other a basic way, but each approach believes that the other calls it 
“fundamental” for the wrong reasons. While there is growing recognition that 
positing both joints and basic ways as is consistent (cf. Bennett 2017), this still 
allows for a metaphysical rivalry in that this allows that either joints or basic ways 
reduces to the other. In this paper, I argue that joints and basic ways are 
metaphysically distinct but equally genuine statuses of properties – where neither is 
“built” out of the other.  
My primary argument is that joints and basic ways crosscut. For the sake of 
being exhaustive and ecumenical, I distinguish between natural and normative 
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sorts of joints and basic ways (§1). Yet, for both sorts, the joints are not always the 
basic ways (§2), and the basic ways are not always the joints (§3). While this 
crosscutting does not by itself preclude a complex metaphysical account of one in 
terms of the other, I argue that the best account treats the statuses of being a joint 
and being a basic way as metaphysically distinct such that neither is built from the 
other (§4).  
Caveat: I focus on properties because that allows for a common entity to 
invoke in discussing jointiness and basicness. Thus, it avoids trivializing the thesis 
that joints and basic ways crosscut merely because they apply to different sorts of 
entities. Thus, while I set aside ongoing disputes about the best regimentation of 
jointiness, on the one hand, and basicness, on the other, I assume that there is some 
way of construing properties as jointy or basic.2 
 
1. Varieties of Joints and Basic Ways 
 
2 Long footnote on allowing joints and basic ways to be properties:  
On the jointiness side, some reserve the status of naturalness, sparseness, or structure just to properties 
(Armstrong 1978), some to objects and properties (Lewis 1983), and others only to ideology (Sider 2011). I assume 
that we can at least speak of properties as being joints or not. This already accords with Armstrong and Lewis’ 
positions, though not Sider’s official view that “structure” applies only to “notions”. However, Sider’s view can 
certainly be adapted by someone who believes in properties – as suggested by his repeated informal invocation of 
certain properties as joint carving (cf. 2011: vii, 4-5, 6-8). 
On the basicness side, some regiment grounding as an operator over sentences (Fine 2012), some as a 
relation between facts (Rosen 2010), and others as a relation between entities of arbitrary category (Schaffer 2009; 
cf. Bennett 2017). I assume that properties can in some way enter into grounding relations and that we can 
distinguish between grounded and ungrounded properties. For example, although proponents of fact grounding don’t 
usually talk about grounding of properties themselves, they can treat an ungrounded property as a property featuring 
in an ungrounded fact (implied in Audi (2012)) – or, for those who think some properties qua entities are basic, they 
can more narrowly treat an ungrounded property as a property whose existence fact is ungrounded. Proponents of 
entity grounding should allow for properties to be among the entities that enter into the grounding relation, and so an 
ungrounded property would be a property not grounded in any other entity (Schaffer 2009). Of course, any particular 
regimentation will be substantive and controversial, but there must be some way of capturing grounding 
connections, or lack thereof, between properties. 
I thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify my commitment to property grounding. 
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Within the general notions of joints and basic ways, we must differentiate 
between various kinds. In this section, I distinguish between natural and normative 
joints and basic ways.3 I assume that there are these two sorts of joints and basic 
ways because it allows my argument to be maximally general and neutral. The 
argument is if there are such kinds of joints and basic ways, then for each kind the 
joints and basic ways crosscut. Thus, one needn’t believe in both kinds of natural 
and normative joints and basic ways. So long as one believes in just one of these 
sorts, then joints and basic ways of that sort, and hence joints and basic ways as 
such, crosscut.4 
 
1.i Joints 
The joints are the properties that serve to horizontally structure the world by 
being unified and horizontally productive. They are unified in that they underwrite 
 
3 There are two ways to understand the qualifiers “natural” and “normative”. One is that there is a single status of 
jointiness and to say a property is a natural joint is to say it’s a natural property that’s a joint and to say a property is 
a normative joint is to say it’s a normative property that’s a joint. Likewise, for the status of being a basic way. Another 
is to hold there are different statuses, so that there is a natural sort of jointiness and a normative sort of jointiness. 
Likewise, for the status of being a basic way. The difference between these understandings won’t matter for the 
purposes of my argument. On either understanding, I argue that joints and basic ways crosscut, so I set aside the 
distinction in what follows. 
 As an aside, perhaps there are also mathematical/logical joints and basic ways. Mathematical joints are the 
privileged properties of the mathematical realm, such as plus rather than quus – where quus(x, y) = x+y, if x, y < 57, 
and 5 otherwise (Kripke 1982: 22). Mathematical basic ways would be the properties at the foundation of the 
mathematical world, such as being zero and the set-builder relation. I leave exploration of their connection for another 
time. 
4 If you uphold both sorts of joints but not both sorts of basic ways – or vice versa – then it immediately follows that 
joints and basic ways as such crosscut. For instance, if you think there are normative joints but no normative basic 
ways – say, if you’re a metaethical naturalist who wants to distinguish good from schmood – then by that very fact 
you believe there are joints that are not basic ways. Or, if you think that there are normative basic ways but only 
natural joints – say, if you like normative basic ways, but, following Armstrong (1978) and Lewis (1983), think that 
jointiness requires endowing causal powers and deny that normative properties do so – then you already think that 
there are basic ways that aren’t joints. 
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genuine similarity, and they are horizontally productive by facilitating the 
production of further entities at their same level of reality. Accordingly, joints enter 
into the best explanations.  
Natural joints are the properties that unify nature by making for similarity 
among natural things, and they are causally productive in that they endow novel 
causal powers. Being an electron is a natural joint in that it underwrites genuine 
similarity among electrons and because it endows electrons with new causal powers 
of attraction and repulsion. A gerrymandered property like being an electron before 
2050 A.D. or not being an electron after is not a natural joint in that it neither 
underwrites genuine similarity nor endows novel causal powers. As Lewis says in 
describing Armstrong’s notion of sparse universals, ‘There are the universals that 
there must be to ground the objective resemblances and the causal powers of things, 
and there is no reason to believe in anymore’ (1983: 345). The natural joints, 
accordingly, enter into the best scientific explanations and are the eligible 
candidates for entering into the laws of nature.  
Normative joints are the unified properties that make for similarity in the 
normative realm, and they are normatively productive by supplying novel reasons. 
Being good is a normative joint in that it underwrites genuine normative similarity 
between any two states of affairs that are good, and being good provides distinctive 
reasons to promote anything that has it. This contrasts with a gruesome normative 
property like being schmood – the property of being good before 2050 A.D or not 
being good after – which does not underwrite normative similarity or provide for 
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distinctive reasons. Normative joints like being an agent and being a reason are the 
privileged edifice of the normative realm (cf. Enoch and McPherson: sec. 6), and 
they are thereby distinguished from normatively gerrymandered properties, like 
schmagents (Enoch 2006) and counter-reasons (Enoch 2011: ch 5, sec. 3; cf. 
McPherson 2011). Normative joints, consequently, make for the best normative 
explanations and are the eligible candidates for entering into general normative 
principles. 
 
1.ii Basic ways 
The basic ways are the properties that vertically structure the world by 
serving as the base-layer of reality and vertically producing all higher-layers.  
Natural basic ways are the properties at the foundation of the natural world, 
including the ultimate properties of physics like spin, mass, and charge. The natural 
basic ways ground all higher-level natural properties, like the chemical property of 
being oxygen and the psychological property of being in pain. 
Normative basic ways are the properties at the foundation of the normative 
world (Frugé, manuscript). Depending on one’s moral theory, they might include 
being good, being autonomous, or having eudemonia. Such properties generate the 
rest of the normative realm. For consequentialists, being good helps ground 
properties like being better and being optimific. Or, for those consequentialists like 
John Broome (2004: ch. 2), who think being better grounds being good, then being 
better is a normative basic way. For deontological autonomy theorists, being 
7 
 
autonomous helps ground properties like being impermissible. For eudemonistic 
virtue-ethicists, having eudemonia helps ground properties like being courageous 
and all the other specific virtues. 
2: Joints but Not Basic Ways 
 
 In this section, I argue that there are joints that are not basic ways. I begin 
with the natural case and then turn to the normative case.  
 
2.i Natural joints that aren’t natural basic ways 
To find a natural joint that is not a natural basic way, we need to find a 
unifying and causally productive natural property that is grounded. 
 
2.i.a Multiply realizable joints 
 
Consider chemical properties, like being oxygen, and psychological properties, 
like being in pain. On a broadly Putnamian (1975) and Fodorian (1974) view, such 
higher-level scientific properties have the following three features: multiple 
realizability, novel causal powers, and explanatory autonomy. 
 Multiple realizability. Being oxygen can be realized by a host of physical 
states that differ, for example, with respect to the exact location of various 
electrons. Being in pain can be realized in a dizzying array of fundamental states, 
including those of humans, cats, and even silicon-based aliens. Similarly, for having 
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a desire. As multiply realized, such properties are not identical to their 
microphysical realizers, but rather grounded in them – and so they are not basic 
ways. 
 Causal power. Being oxygen has unique causal powers. For one thing, two 
oxygen atoms can combine with a hydrogen atom to make H2O. Being in pain has 
new causal powers, beyond those of its realizers, in that, for instance, it can cause 
avoidance behavior and further mental states like desiring to flee.   
 Explanatory autonomy. Many explanations do better when they appeal to 
high-level properties. As Hilary Putnam (1975) points out, you have a better 
explanation of why the square peg does not go through the round hole in terms of 
high-level geometrical facts than you do in terms of microphysics. The same goes for 
explaining chemical bonding and avoidance behavior. Explaining why someone 
desires to flee in terms of their microphysical properties is a worse explanation than 
citing psychological properties like being in pain. 
 As higher-level properties, being oxygen and being in pain are not natural 
basic ways of being, but the realized results of underlying physical patterns (cf. 
Schaffer 2004). Being oxygen is not a fundamental physical property. Rather, being 
oxygen is a chemical property that something that a thing has in virtue of lower-
level physical patterns. Being in pain is a mental property that something has in 
virtue of physical realizers. Yet from a non-reductive perspective, such properties 
are natural joints. 
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 Being oxygen helps structure the chemical-level of the world, and is not 
gruesome or gerrymandered. Contrast being oxygen with being schmoxygen, the 
property of being oxygen before 2050 A.D. or being lithium after. Being oxygen gives 
its possessors genuine similarity to one another, endows causal powers, and 
features in the best scientific explanations – whereas being schmoxygen does not.  
 Similarly, being in pain helps structure the psychological-level of the world. 
Contrast it with being in schmain, which is either being in pain before 2050 A.D. or 
having a desire after. Being in pain provides for new causal powers and enters into 
the best cognitive scientific explanations – whereas being in schmain does not. 
Moreover, being in pain makes for genuine similarity, whereas being in schmain 
does not. The argument is not simply that being in pain makes for more similarity 
than being in schmain, but rather that being in pain underwrites genuine similarity 
and being in schmain does not. Any genuine similarity it seems to underwrite is 
really due to being in pain or having a desire. 
 However, some might think that multiple realizability cuts against counting 
a property as a joint. The thought, I take it, is that multiply realizable properties 
can be realized in very different underlying microphysical structures, which then 
cuts against the “unity” of the properties such that they can’t be perfectly jointy.5  
Yet, this intuition conflates joint-theoretic with ground-theoretic status. 
Certainly, multiply realizable properties have a range of distinct grounds. But my 
overall argument is precisely that grounded properties can still be jointy, so we 
 
5 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
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should be careful not to appeal to considerations from grounding to decide whether 
or not it is a joint. Indeed, a property that is jointy but has a variety of possible 
grounds serves to unify across otherwise disparate entities. That a human and an 
octopus can both instantiate being in pain doesn’t show that being in pain is not a 
joint – but rather that if being in pain is a joint, then humans and octopuses can 
partake in some of the same unified mental states. Instead of looking to ground-
theoretic status, in determining whether a property is a joint we should determine 
whether it enters into some of the best explanations, makes for genuine similarity, 
and – for natural joints – underwrites novel causal powers. Being in pain, multiply 
realizable as it is, does this.  
 
2.i.b Acceleration 
 
Moreover, there are examples of natural joints that are not basic ways that 
do not involve multiply realizable properties. Consider acceleration, which is 
grounded as the second-derivative of position. Now take a world that obeys 
Newtonian laws of mechanics in that force = mass × acceleration. Acceleration is not 
a basic way in that it is grounded in position. Yet, acceleration features in the laws 
of physics of this Newtonian world, and so mediates causation. 
 In light of these sorts of considerations, Hicks and Schaffer (2017) argue that 
laws of nature can feature properties that are not basic ways and so are “non-
fundamental”, while Sider (2020: 19, fn. 30) argues that Newton’s law really is sum 
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of component forces = mass × second time derivative of position, and so involves only 
properties that are joints and thereby “fundamental”.  
However, given my view that we should appeal to both joints and basic ways, 
there’s a way to make both parties happy – well, unhappy. Newton’s law is indeed 
force = mass × acceleration, and so laws of nature can feature properties that are 
not basic ways but they must still be joints. Acceleration is thus a natural joint, but 
not a basic way. 
 
 
2.ii Normative joints that aren’t normative basic ways 
To find a normative joint that is not a normative basic way, we need to find a 
normative property that is unifying and supplies distinctive reasons and yet is 
grounded. 
Consider evaluative properties like impersonal better than, deontic properties 
like being impermissible, and virtue-ethical properties like being courageous. Some 
consequentialists may be wary of deontic properties and virtues, but they admit of 
evaluative relations like better than. Some deontologists may be wary of impersonal 
evaluations and virtues, but they admit of facts about impermissibility. Some virtue 
ethicists might be wary impersonal evaluations and deontic properties, but they 
admit of virtues like being courageous, or at least some other virtue. Because I do 
not want to get into controversial disputes over which is the correct ethical theory, 
read the following as an argument by disjunctive elimination. If consequentialism is 
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correct, then better than is a normative joint. If deontology is correct, then being 
impermissible is a normative joint. If virtue ethics is correct, then being courageous, 
or some other virtue, is a normative joint. But one of consequentialism, deontology, 
or virtue-ethics is the correct ethical theory, so one of these properties is a 
normative joint – yet on none of these views are these respective properties 
normative basic ways. Thus, even though I don’t know which particular ethical 
theory is true, I believe that something like one of the following examples is right. 
Start with better than. For consequentialists, better than provides distinctive 
reasons in that it enables one option to be more choiceworthy than another. It also 
makes for genuine similarity between any two otherwise diverse pairs of options in 
which one is better than the other. Moreover, it features in some of the best 
normative explanations, such as those that appear in population ethics (Parfit 1984: 
pt. 4; Temkin 2012).  
Better than thus contrasts with gerrymandered normative features like 
schmetter than, which is better than unless Teddy Roosevelt thinks otherwise. This 
relation schmetter than doesn’t make for genuine similarity between pairs of 
options, supply distinctive reasons, or enter into the best normative explanations. 
Crucially, the reasons that better than provides are truly distinctive in that, for 
instance, they are distinct from those provided by being good. Being better than 
makes options more choiceworthy than alternatives, and being good gives reason to 
pursue an option in itself. Thus, they make for different kinds of distinctive reasons, 
so they are different normative joints.  
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Hence, better than is a normative joint, but most consequentialists consider 
better than as grounded in the more basic impersonal normative property of being 
good. Of course, the details as to exactly how better than is grounded in being good 
are controversial. For example, in population ethics, some think that one population 
of people is better than another when it has more total good, or when it has higher 
average good, or when it maximizes the worst off, or disperses additional burdens, 
or satisfies some combination of these and still other distributional considerations 
besides.6 But among those who take being good as a normatively basic way, it’s 
uncontroversial that better than is grounded in some sort of distribution of being 
good.7  
Turn to the deontic property of being impermissible, which, for deontologists, 
is a normative joint. Being impermissible is a crucial normative status of an action 
that provides a deontic reason not to perform it. Moreover, any two actions that are 
impermissible are genuinely similar along a normative dimension, and 
impermissibility appears in the best deontological theories. Yet, most deontologists 
don’t appeal to fundamental facts about impermissibility, but rather ground it in 
notions like rights (Thomson 1990), Kantian (1785) constraints on 
universalizability, or contractualist concerns about reasonable rejection (Scanlon 
 
6 For discussion of all these options, and more, see Larry Temkin (2012). I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pushing me to go into more of the details about this. 
7 As for those who take better than as basic and ground being good in it (Broome 2004: ch. 2), they 
can just make the parallel argument about being good. For being good, as we just saw, itself supplies 
distinctive reasons and thereby carves at the normative joints. 
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2000). Hence, being impermissible is not a normative basic way, and yet it is still a 
normative joint. 
Finally, consider being courageous – or any other virtue you prefer. For 
virtue-ethicists, actions that would exemplify the trait of courage thereby provide 
distinctive reasons for a virtuous agent to perform them, and courageous agents are 
all genuinely similar to that extent. Moreover, courage, or at least your preferred 
virtue, features in the best virtue-ethical explanations. Yet, at least for eudaemonist 
virtue ethics, being courageous is not a normative basic way. Eudaemonists hold 
that virtues are grounded in more basic normative features of human flourishing or 
agency, such as having eudemonia.8 And even on other virtue-ethical views, being 
courageous is not brutely virtuous – presumably its virtue is grounded in some other 
features such as its relating to proper motivations, or an aim to respond 
appropriately to fear and danger, or whatever. Being courageous is not plausibly 
normatively bedrock. 
Whether or not one is a consequentialist, deontologist, or virtue-ethicists, 
there are normative joints that are not basic ways.  
 
2.iii Jointy but not basic 
Thus, joints are not always basic ways. The natural joints are not always the 
natural basic ways, and the normative joints are not always the normative basic 
 
8 For discussion, see Hursthouse and Pettigrove (2018: sec. 2.1). So this argument won’t work for virtue theorists 
who hold that being courageous is intrinsically virtuous and doesn’t have its virtue grounded in something like 
having eudemonia. But the eudaemonist view I mention is a prominent one, and so it at least shows that the view 
that there are joints that are not basic ways is a serious contender. 
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ways. So long as you buy one of these sorts of joints and basic ways, then you should 
believe that joints and basic ways as such crosscut.  
3. Basic Ways but Not Joints 
 
In this section, I argue that there are basic ways that are not joints. There 
are properties which are ungrounded and yet aren’t unifying or horizontally 
productive. I begin with the natural case and then turn to the normative case.  
 
3.i Natural basic ways that aren’t natural joints 
To find a natural basic way that isn’t a natural joint, we need to find a 
natural property that is ungrounded and yet doesn’t endow novel causal powers.   
I argue that position, at least in worlds that obey Newtonian laws of physics, 
offers a candidate for just such a property. As before, consider a world that obeys 
Newtonian laws of physics. Assume that position is a basic way – for instance, 
assume substantivalism about space. Given that in this world Newton’s laws 
mediate physical causation, and position does not appear in Newton’s laws, then 
position does not endow causal powers. Rather, position grounds acceleration, which 
appears in the law force = mass × acceleration and thereby, as we saw, is a joint 
that is not a basic way. But, then, position is a basic way that’s not a joint. 
In fact, it’s easy to cook up cases where ungrounded properties don’t endow 
any causal powers in that the properties they ground are the only ones that features 
in the laws of nature. Take a cheesy example of a world where the only thing that 
16 
 
happens is that negatively charged particles with mass repel each other at a 
constant rate, regardless of their specific masses and charges. Particles that are 
merely negatively charged don’t repel, and particles that are merely massive don’t 
repel. Rather, particles both negatively charged and massive to any degree to repel 
one another.  
In this world, the law of nature mentions being negatively charged and 
massive in that it states that negatively charged massive particles repel one 
another. This conjunctive property is therefore a natural joint,9 but it’s grounded in 
more basic mass and charge properties making up its conjuncts. Take, then, a basic 
way that helps to ground this conjunctive property. This basic way doesn’t feature 
in any laws, and so doesn’t endow any causal powers – only the conjunctive being 
negatively charged and massive does – and so it’s not a joint. 
 
3.ii Normative basic ways that aren’t normative joints 
To find a normative basic way that isn’t a normative joint, we need to find a 
normative property that is ungrounded and yet doesn’t supply distinctive reasons. I 
argue that the personal value relation good-for does not, by itself, supply any 
reasons at all, and thereby doesn’t supply distinctive reasons. Good-for only supplies 
reasons in combination with other considerations, and so all those considerations 
 
9 Thus, it seems that jointiness is not something necessary to a property, but can vary world to world. 
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taken together – not good-for itself – is a normative joint. But good-for, I argue, is 
ungrounded – at least not in any further normative properties.10 
Let’s start with the argument that good-for is a normative basic way. Most 
ethicists, consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists alike, believe in 
wellbeing even if they disagree about its moral implications. But, along with bad-
for, the relation of good-for underwrites wellbeing in that it relates the person to 
those possible things that would make their life go better, were they to come about. 
Hence, most ethicists allow for the good-for relation. However, good-for is not 
grounded in any further normative property. For instance, good-for cannot be 
understood in terms of impersonal good (Smith 2003), because this wouldn’t capture 
the special reasons that one has in relation to one’s own wellbeing (Korsgaard 
2013). Thus, good-for must be taken to be a normative basic way.  
Turning to supplying reasons, good-for does not supply reasons by itself. If 
ought implies can, then someone only has reasons given that they have some ability 
to act on those reasons, but there are many things that are good-for someone 
without their being able to act on them. Consider procreation cases. Prior to 
existing, someone’s life can be good for them. But while one doesn’t exist one can’t 
act on any reasons, and so, in particular, while someone doesn’t exist they don’t 
have any reasons to be created to acquire a good life. As a non-procreation case, a 
late-entry career as a superstar NBA player might be good for me, but it’s only in 
one of the weakest senses of “can” that I can accomplish this. Normative joints 
 
10 This is enough, because I’m assuming, remember, that there are some normative basic ways, so I’m 
setting aside, for instance, the view that good-for is grounded in some natural property. 
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supply distinctive reasons, but because good-for by itself does not supply reasons, 
then good-for is not a normative joint.  
Of course, this leaves open that good-for might supply distinctive reasons in 
combination with other considerations – such as those involving the person’s 
already being created or having certain abilities – but that means that it is that 
combination of considerations, not good-for by itself, that is a normative joint. Yet, 
while good-for is plausibly not a normative joint, it is still a normative basic way. 
 
3.iii Basic but not jointy 
Thus, basic ways are not always joints. The natural basic ways are not 
always the natural joints, and the normative basic ways are not always the 
normative joints. So long as you buy into one of these sorts of joints and basic ways, 
then you should believe that joints and basic ways as such crosscut.  
 
 
4. Metaphysical Distinctness 
  
So far I have argued against treating the structure of joints and basic ways as 
aligned. This leaves open the options of rejecting one or more of joints or basic ways, 
holding out hope for a more complex account of one in terms of the other, or treating 
the two as metaphysically distinct properties. I argue that we have good reason to 
take the third option. 
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 As far as rejecting the postulation of either joints or basic ways, I simply take 
for granted that each posit of joints and basic ways is theoretically useful enough to 
think that there are indeed joints and basic ways. Let’s start with joints. In the 
natural case, some kind of naturalness structure is useful to characterize similarity 
among natural objects, the eligible properties to enter into the laws of nature, and, 
more generally, to make sense of scientific practice (Sider 2011: ch. 3; Lewis 1983; 
Armstrong 1978). In terms of normative joints, we need them for parallel reasons of 
making sense of similarity across normative states of affairs, the eligible properties 
to enter into moral principles, and, more generally, making sense of normative 
practice. Turning to basic ways, they are needed to make sense of the levels of 
reality. In the natural case, natural basic ways are needed to capture the bottom, 
physical layer of nature that gives rise to the chemical, biological, and social. In the 
normative case, the normative basic ways are need to make sense of foundational 
normative properties that give rise to all others.  
As far as holding out hope for a more complex account of either joint or basic 
way in terms of the other, I obviously cannot prove the negative existential that there 
is no such account. Yet, the fact that joints and basic ways crosscuts undermines what 
would be the most straightforward proposal: that they are identical or otherwise co-
extensive. Moreover, proponents of joints and proponents of basic ways, respectively, 
treat these as metaphysically unanalyzable (cf. Sider 2011: chs. 7-8; Bennett 2017a: 
ch. 5). Thus, I am simply following the proponents of each status in holding that 
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neither jointiness nor basicness can be metaphysically accounted for in terms of the 
other.  
Insofar as we take joint and basic ways as separate statuses of properties, then 
we recognize that the world admits of two different types of metaphysical structure. 
Indeed, the only reason I could provide both examples of joints that are not basic ways 
and basic ways that are not joints is that both sorts of metaphysical status are needed 
to characterize distinct aspects of reality. The structure of the joints discloses the 
scaffolding of the world. They are the unifying and horizontally productive elements 
that horizontally structure each layer of reality. The structure of basic ways reveals 
the basic-layer of reality. They are the foundational elements that give rise to each 
layer and thereby vertically structure the hierarchy of reality. Neither structure is 
neatly reflected in the other. Our theories need to limn both. 
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